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FISCAL STIMULUS, JOB CREATION,
AND THE ECONOMY: WHAT ARE THE
LESSONS OF THE NEW DEAL?
greg hannsgen anddimitri b. papadimitriou
The Need for a New Look at the New Deal
As the nation watches the impact of the recent stimulus bill on job creation and economic growth,
a group of academics continues to dispute the notion that the fiscal and job creation programs of
the New Deal helped end the Depression. The work of these revisionist scholars has led to a pub-
lic debate that has obvious implications for the controversy surrounding fiscal stimulus bills. Since
we support a new stimulus package, one that emphasizes jobs for the 9.8 percent of the workforce
that is currently unemployed, we have been concerned about this debate. We will use this policy
note to outline our disagreements with recent unfavorable assessments of President Roosevelt’s
deficits, public works projects, and relief programs, having dealt with critiques of some other New
Deal programs in a recent public policy brief (Papadimitriou and Hannsgen 2009). Because we
are not economic historians and have tried our best to keep this note short, we cannot do justice
to the academic literature on this subject, though we provide some references to this work. Rather,
our purpose is to respond to arguments that have appeared frequently in magazines, newspapers,
and other popular forums (e.g., Barro 2009; Ohanian 2009; Reynolds 2009). The Great Depression and Roosevelt’s
Macroeconomic Response
When Roosevelt took office, the unemployment rate had
reached 25 percent and the country’s economic outlook was
dismal. Modern economist Nancy E. Rose describes the dire con-
ditions of the 1930s:
The unemployed are selling apples on street corners to
make a few pennies or standing in line at soup kitchens,
while food is rotting in the fields because the farmers can-
not sell it for enough to make it worth harvesting. Houses
are boarded up and farms foreclosed as the owners fail to
meet their mortgage payments, and apartments are vacant
since people have no money for rent. The growing num-
bers of homeless are building ramshackle temporary hous-
ing out of cardboard and wood on the outskirts of cities
across the country. Panicked depositors are withdrawing
their money from banks, which are failing one after the
other, while barter is replacing cash transactions. Rising
unemployment and falling incomes are leading to declin-
ing tax revenues, and in many towns teachers are out of
work and children are out of school. (1994, 16–17) 
It is hard to imagine any program that could have quickly
and inexpensively solved these problems. On the other hand,
the period between the Great Crash in 1929 and the beginning
of Roosevelt’s first term in 1933 offered little evidence that the
economy could recover on its own—a hope maintained through-
out this recession by many contemporary economists, business-
men, and others. Economic historian Peter Temin of MIT has
presented a particularly convincing account of the failure of the
economy to recover spontaneously in the early 1930s, and of the
strong economic headwinds faced by the newly elected Roosevelt
and Congress in 1933 (1976, 138–68).
Roosevelt initiated what was to become a series of public
works programs in his “first 100 days” in office. Macroeconomists
have been estimating the numbers of jobs created, as well as the
wider impact of the era’s fiscal policy changes. Such estimates
usually do not include payoffs that are realized gradually over
time, as society reaps the economic benefits of bridges, post
offices, and other outputs of works programs, which have been
impressively documented in Robert D. Leighninger’s Long-Range
Public Investment: The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal (2007). It
is also important to remember that the New Deal included many
programs that created jobs in more indirect ways—by improving
the affordability of mortgages, stabilizing the banking system,
bringing electricity to more rural areas, and so on.
New Deal Fiscal Stimulus: Ineffectual or Just Not
Big Enough?
Roosevelt’s jobs programs were massive and ambitious, but the
intensity of these efforts varied over time. Roosevelt has been
called “a decidedly reluctant and an exceedingly moderate
Keynesian” (Kennedy 1999, 361), an apt description for a pres-
ident who called for a balanced budget in his first national cam-
paign. Roosevelt’s Economy Act, passed in March 1933, reduced
veterans’ benefits and federal employees’ salaries by $500 mil-
lion (Leuchtenburg 1963, 45). (This is a large amount, consid-
ering that total federal outlays were $4.6 billion that year [OMB
2009]). In 1937, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. dis-
mayed Keynesians in the White House by calling for spending
cuts and “progress toward a balance of the federal budget”
(Shlaes 2007, 342). Moreover, even as Washington sharply
increased spending from 1933 to 1936, tax-revenue shortfalls
were forcing state and local governments to cut their expenditures
on roads and other projects. (There are similar problems right
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now at the state and local levels, and the resulting fiscal under-
tow is partially offsetting an admittedly strong fiscal push from
Washington.)
It is interesting to trace the paths of the federal budget
deficit and GDP growth starting in the year of the Great Crash,
through the New Deal period, and to 1945, the last year of World
War II.Figure 1 shows the unsteady path of fiscal policy (repre-
sented by the broken line), which is measured on the right axis
as the federal government deficit deflated by the Consumer
Price Index (CPI). 
The CPI equaled approximately 1 in July 1983.1 By compar-
ison, the inflation-adjusted deficit for fiscal year 2008, which does
not appear in the figure, was $218 billion. The deficit had already
been rising for at least two years when the New Deal began. 
Its rise was interrupted in 1934 and, more sharply, in 1936–37,
around the time Morgenthau spoke out against Keynesianism.
The 1930s deficits caused great concern but were soon over-
shadowed by those of the war years. It is hard to find an unam-
biguous association between the deficit and real GDP growth
(depicted in the figure by a solid line), but the resurgence in
growth from 1933 to 1937 followed a rapid rise in the deficit.
Similarly, the recession of 1937–38 occurred after the deficit 
fell by half in 1936 and nearly to zero in 1937. As the deficit
rebounded from this experiment, growth returned and soon
reached nearly 20 percent per year.
Of course, sometimes government deficits occur because
households report less taxable income, for example, not because
policymakers intentionally stimulate the economy. Hence, there
have been efforts by economists to measure the true strength of
the push provided by fiscal policy. One classic study by E. Carey
Brown found that the net contribution of fiscal policy to the
demand for goods and services at all levels of government sub-
stantially exceeded 1929 levels in 1931 and 1936 but not in any
other year of the decade, an observation that led Brown to
write, “Fiscal policy, then, seems to have been an unsuccessful
recovery device in the ’thirties—not because it did not work,
but because it was not tried” (1956, 863–66). According to
Brown, spending increased, but the overall stimulus was small
owing to “the sharp increases in tax structures enacted at all 
levels of government” (867). The surge in growth early in
Roosevelt’s presidency is now viewed by Barry Eichengreen
(1992) and many other economic historians as resulting from
the abandonment of the gold standard and other nonfiscal fac-
tors, though few would deny that the New Deal deficits were of
some help. Brown himself concluded that only the much
greater economic jolt provided by wartime military expendi-
tures allowed the economy to realize the full potential of fiscal
policy (1956, 869).
Perhaps more important than the size of the fiscal stimulus
was the number of jobs created by the Works Progress
Administration and other federal agencies. An official study by
John Kenneth Galbraith found that from 1934 to 1938, employ-
ment in federal public works programs equaled 13–15 percent
of the total number of workers unemployed, with work relief
construction employment amounting to an additional 18–21
percent of that number (1975 [1940], 109). These figures are far
from comprehensive, as they do not include, for example, jobs
outside of construction or the “multiplier” effects generated when
federal workers spent their paychecks at private businesses.
However, they do show that the persistence of mass unemploy-
ment throughout the 1930s should be blamed mostly on the
enormity of the task at hand and Roosevelt’s reluctance to run
deficits. (Some misleading employment statistics from the era,
which leave out large numbers of public sector workers, have
led a number of scholars to understate the success of the gov-
ernmental effort to reduce unemployment.)
The Fiscal-policy Skeptics 
Since debates about stimulus packages began last year, there has
been a flurry of polemics on the effects of fiscal policy in blogs
and newspapers (e.g., Barro 2009). Some economists argue that
when the government increases deficits or hires new workers,
businesses cut production. Often, these arguments depend on
the idea of Ricardian equivalence—that taxpayers put aside
substantially more money for future tax payments when the
government deficit-spends. To show that this effect completely
offsets the effects of higher government deficits requires assump-
tions that seem unrealistic. Also, some analyses implicitly
assume that there are no unemployed resources in the economy,
so that government cannot hire workers or borrow money with-
out reducing the amount of these “inputs” available to private
industry. 
In an effort to overcome the limitations of such theories,
John Maynard Keynes tried in his 1936 book The General
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money to develop a new
kind of macroeconomics that would be useful when significant
numbers of people were unemployed and machines were idle.Policy Note, 2009/10 4
He developed an argument that public spending (and monetary
policy) could alleviate such conditions. Looking at the issue
from a more pragmatic standpoint, numerous empirical stud-
ies done over the years show that fiscal stimulus does matter,
though perhaps less than Keynes and many of his contempo-
raries hoped. Critics point out that a large portion of tax cuts
and transfers to consumers is not spent, but with many house-
holds’ “balance sheets” in bad shape, money set aside to rebuild
savings accounts and pay off household debt is perhaps just as
beneficial to households, and to the wider economy. The account
above suggests that the experience of the New Deal era only
strengthens the case for the effectiveness of fiscal policies and
jobs programs.  
Nearly Two Years into the Great Recession: Time to
Look to Keynes Again?
While many economic indicators hint that the economy is
growing once again, Paul Krugman (2009), Nouriel Roubini
(2009), and others have been arguing convincingly that a very
sluggish recovery or double-dip recession is likely. At this point,
renewed and sustained economic growth can hardly be taken
for granted, but the most pressing need is to deal with unem-
ployment. Consider just how serious this problem is. The U.S.
Department of Labor’s broadest measure of civilian unemploy-
ment includes both part-time workers “who want and are avail-
able for” full-time work and people “who currently are neither
working nor looking for work but indicate that they want and
are available for a job and have looked for work sometime in the
recent past.” This group now makes up 17.0 percent of the labor
force (BLS 2009a). Over half of the workers who were unem-
ployed in September (by the traditional federal definition) had
been out of work for 15 weeks or more (BLS 2009b). It is next to
impossible to find work when there are 6.0 job seekers per open-
ing, as there were by the most recent count (Shierholz 2009).
In spite of the stimulus packages and other large outlays,
the economy remains far from the barrier of full employment,
so Keynes’s general theory of an economy that often has unem-
ployed resources is still apropos. Moreover, there is good reason
to think that what worked in the Great Depression would work
again today, though again, the task at hand is enormous.
However, we lament that many Keynesian commentators focus
almost exclusively on the amount of stimulus needed. Some
types of stimulus would be more effective than others in creating
jobs. In particular, a permanent employer-of-last-resort (ELR)
program, as proposed by Hyman P. Minsky (1965; 2008 [1986],
308–13), would provide cost-effective and noninflationary insur-
ance against unemployment and allow the government to cut
spending on some other safety-net programs. (Papadimitriou
1999 makes the case for an ELR program.)The Levy Institute has
proposed other “high quality” forms of fiscal stimulus in past
publications (e.g., Papadimitriou and Wray 2001a, 2001b). 
Congress, the White House, pundits, and the press are riv-
eted on the all-important health care debate, but we worry that
they are also distracted by skirmishes over economic theory and
history, while millions wait for a new chance to do meaningful
work and effective, if imperfect, policy tools are readily at hand.
Note
1.  The official CPI equals approximately 100 in July 1983, but
we divided it by 100 before calculating the inflation-adjusted
deficit for each year. This is equivalent to using the definition
Inflation-adjusted Deficit = (Deficit*100)/(Official CPI). This
adjustment makes Figure 1 easier to read and has no effect
on comparisons between any two inflation-adjusted deficits
depicted therein. However, the deficits shown in the figure
should not be compared with similar deficit series com-
puted using official CPI data.
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